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CRIMINAL LAW
COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED ATTORNEYS IN STATE TORT
ACTIONS
The liability of a public defender in a state tort
action for malpractice has been decided in two
recent cases. In Ferri v. Ackermani the United States
Supreme Court held that federal law does not
grant immunity from state malpractice actions to
an attorney appointed by a federal court to repre-
sent a defendant in a criminal trial. 2 Reese v. Dan-
forth,3 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
significantly added to the scarce case law4 on the
issue of state immunity when it held that Pennsyl-
vania state public defenders are not immune from
1 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979).
2 Id. at 410.
3 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979) (plurality opinion).
4 There ar only five other reported cases which men-
tion the issue of whether states provide public defenders
or court-appointed attorneys with immunity from mal-
practice suits. See Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923 (2d
Cir. 1979); Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th
Cir. 1978); Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973);
Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C. 1968);
Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871
(1975). Spring was the only case that directly addressed
the question of whether a state public defender could be
immune from liability for malpractice, and the Connect-
icut Supreme Court refused to grant such immunity. 168
Conn. at 576, 362 A.2d at 879. Relying upon the Spring
case, the Second Circuit in the Housand case said that the
plaintiff, although unable to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), would be able to sue his federal court-appointed
attorney under Connecticut law. The court remanded
the case to determine whether diversity jurisdiction ex-
isted so that the federal court could hear the state court
claim. 594 F.2d at 926.
In Walker, a suit based on diversity jurisdiction, the
Seventh Circuit dismissed the complaint alleging public
defender malpractice because, among other reasons, it
thought that Illinois might grant public defenders im-
munity from malpractice actions. 484 F.2d at 804. As
support for its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied upon
the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court had already
affirmed the client's conviction, even though the client
had argued that his conviction was due in part to his
attorney's incompetence.
In Robinson and Vance, the courts simply mentioned in
dicta that perhaps the plaintiffs might have causes of
action against the state public defender for malpractice
under the state laws. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at
411 (possible action under Illinois law); Vance v. Robin-
son, 292 F. Supp. at 788 (possible action under North
Carolina law). The courts mentioned this possibility after
holding that there was certainly no cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 579 F.2d at 411; 292 F. Supp.
at 788.
malpractice suits brought against them for their
conduct in state court proceedings.
5
As a result of these two cases, a court-appointed
attorney will receive no federal immunity from
state malpractice liability, regardless of whether
the attorney was appointed by a federal or a state
court. However, on the state level, only the courts
of Pennsylvania and Connecticut have decided
whether their respective state laws provide immu-
nity to court-appointed attorneys.
6
State legislatures, as well as Congress, may wish
to provide statutory protection for court-appointed
attorneys. The issue of immunity of a public de-
fender, therefore, must be analyzed carefully to
determine the advisability of providing immunity
either by statute or by state court decisions.
Prior to these two cases, most suits by indigent
defendants against their government-appointed at-
torneys were brought in federal court and stated
claims based on a deprivation of the defendants'
constitutional right of representation. If the attor-
ney had been assigned by a federal court to repre-
sent the defendant in a federal criminal trial,7 the
indigent alleged that the attorney's representation
had been so inadequate that it violated his sixth
amendment right to counsel.' If, on the other hand,
s 406 A.2d at 739 (plurality opinion).
6 Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. at 576, 362 A.2d
at 879; Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d at 739.
7 Many attorneys representing indigents in federal
trials are private attorneys who have been appointed by
the court to represent specific clients. They receive some
compensation from the federal government for the time
they spend representing indigents. In 1970 Congress did
permit the establishment of full time public defenders
offices to supplement the individual appointments of
private attorneys. For a discussion of the federal system
for providing representation to indigent defendants, see
Ferri v. Ackerman, 100 S. Ct. at 407 n.16.
' The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
In Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1979),
for example, the plaintiff sued the federal court-ap-
pointed attorney who had represented him in his criminal
trial in federal court. Appearing pro se, the plaintiff relied
upon 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976) to get jurisdiction in the
federal court. The Second Circuit, in a footnote, acknowl-
edged that § 1983 was not really applicable in this case
because § 1983 requires that the violation of the consti-
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the indigent had been tried in state court and had
been represented by a state public defender, the
indigent alleged that the public defender had vio-
lated section 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts. 9 The
indigent was required to prove that the state public
defender's conduct constituted state action and
that the representation was so inadequate as to
deprive the indigent of his constitutional right to
counsel.10
It is difficult to determine precisely why the
indigents decided to allege constitutional violations
instead of simple torts. Perhaps they believed that
federal judges would be more sympathetic to them.
At least one commentator has suggested that suits
were brought under section 1983 because courts
could award nominal or punitive damages under
that statute while only actual damages could be
recovered in a tort action.1
Whatever the reasons behind the filing of the
actions in federal court, to date no suit alleging
violation of the constitutional right to counsel has
been successful. Actions brought against attorneys
appointed to represent defendants in federal court
have failed for one of two reasons. In some cases
the courts have held that the activities of court-
appointed attorneys do not constitute federal ac-
tion since the attorneys are not federal officials.'
2
One court has taken the position that even if the
federal action requirement is met, the attorneys are
tutional right occur under color of state law. Here there
was no state action because the entire conduct in question
took place in federal court by a federal court-appointed
attorney. Instead of being a § 1983 suit, the Second
Circuit said the action was actually brought under gen-
eral constitutional provisions, i.e., the sixth amendment.
Such a suit, said the court, required federal action just
like a § 1983 suit required state action. Therefore, the
court used the analysis found in § 1983 cases to determine
that there was no cause of action under the United States
Constitution. 594 F.2d at 924 n.1.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
10 U.S. CoNs-r. amend. VI; see note 8 supra.
" Note, Remedying Ineffective Representation by Public De-
fenders-An Administrative Alternative to Traditional Civil Ac-
tions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 123 (1975).
2 
2 See Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d at 925 n.1; Sullens
v. Carroll, 308 F. Supp. 311 (M.D. Fla. 1970). See note 8
supra for a discussion of the federal action requirement.
government officials entitled to immunity from
civil rights suits.1
3
For similar reasons, while increasing numbers of
section 1983 actions against state public defenders
are being filed, 4 none have succeeded. The same
two types of arguments are being advanced as in
the constitutional cases. Some courts have been
adamant that there is no cause of action because,
contrary to the requirements of section 1983, the
state public defender's conduct does not constitute
state action." According to these courts, even
though the public defender is appointed or em-
ployed by the state, he is not a state officer. As an
additional rationale, some courts have held that
even if public defenders act under color of state
law for the purposes of section 1983 jurisdiction,
public policy dictates that they be immune from
section 1983 suits. 6 In some of these cases, the
courts found state action, 7 but in others the courts
found that there was no state action 8 or simply
13 The court in Housand based its holding of immunity
from constitutional suits on its determination that there
was no federal action. The court acknowledged that
another approach would be to hold that even if federal
action were present, defense lawyers would be immune
from § 1983 suits for policy reasons. 594 F.2d at 925.
14 The increase in § 1983 suits against state public
defenders mirrored the general increase in § 1983 suits
against state officials after Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961). In defining the scope of§ 1983 actions in Monroe,
the Supreme Court held that actions could be considered
to have taken place under color of state law even though
the state did not authorize the actions. 365 U.S. at 172.
The Court further held that plaintiffs did not have to
prove that defendants acted with 'a specific intent to
deprive a person of a federal right."' Id. at 187 (quoting
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945)). For a
discussion of the general increase in § 1983 litigation that
followed the Monroe decision, see Developments in the Law-
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1136
n.7 (1977).
15 See, e.g., Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648, 650 (9th Cir.
1977) (dictum); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046,
1047-48 (3d Cir. 1972) (dictum), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950
(1973); United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker, 335 F.
Supp. 43, 47 (D.N.J. 1971); Vance v. Robinson, 292 F.
Supp. 786, 788 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
6 See Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir.
1978); Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977);
Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1102 (1976); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d
Cir. 1972).
17 Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at 407-08.
's In Miller and Brown, the courts said that it was
unlikely that the state public defenders had acted under
color of state law, but held that even if they had, they
were immune from malpractice suits. 549 F.2d at 650;
463 F.2d at 1048.
failed to reach that issue.' 9 All agreed that in order
to recruit public defenders20 and in order to en-
courage them in the full exercise of their profes-
sional judgment, 2 1 public defenders must be im-
mune from section 1983 suits.
Because the suits alleging constitutional viola-
tions have been so unsuccessful, there has been
some discussion recently that unsatisfied indigent
defendants should file malpractice suits in state
courts against their appointed attorneys. At least
three of the courts that held that section 1983 did
not give unsatisfied defendants a cause of action
against their government-appointed defenders sug-
gested that they may have a common-law cause of
action for malpractice against the attorney.2 2 These
suits would not be based on violations of constitu-
tional rights but instead would allege that the
attorney had a contractual or implied duty to
provide adequate assistance of counsel. By breach-
ing that duty, he committed a tort against his
client and, therefore, would be liable under state
common law for any damages caused by his wrong-
ful act.23
If such suits were filed, the question still would
arise as to whether the court-appointed attorney or
public defender was immune from suit. The federal
courts have held that some federal officials are not
liable for injury caused by their public acts,2 4 and
19 Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 900.
2o Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at 408; Miller v.
Barilla, 549 F.2d at 649; Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 901.
The rationale is that since all other court officials-the
judge, the prosecutor, and the clerk of the court-are
immune from suits, the public defender also must be
immune in order to encourage the recruitment of sensitive
and thoughtful lawyers to those positions. Brown v. Jo-
seph, 463 F.2d at 1049.
2' If the public defenders were liable, they would not
be able to exercise their discretion because they "would
be constrained to weigh every decision in terms of poten-
tial liability." Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 902. The burden
of considering potential liability would be particularly
great for public defenders since indigents, who do not
have to pay court costs, are more likely than nonindigents
to bring frivolous claims. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579
F.2d at 410.22 See Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir.
1979) (federal court-appointed attorney); Robinson v.
Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 411 (7th Cir. 1978) (state public
defender); Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786, 788
(W.D.N.C. 1968) (state court-appointed attorney).
23 See, e.g., Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. at 788.
24 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)
(holding that administrative law judges and federal
agency attorneys presenting actions were absolutely im-
mune from civil liability); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S.
593 (1959) (captain in U.S. Navy immune); Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (postmaster general immune).
the state courts have held that certain state officials
are not subject to malpractice suits.25 In addition,
statutes enacted at both the federal and state level
confer immunity on certain individuals.
26
Certain public officials are granted immunity to
enable them to perform their duties in the most
effective manner. It is believed that public officials
should represent the interests of all, not just the
interests of one individual or group. Because not
everyone will be satisfied with the decisions made
in the public interest, public officials potentially
could be the victims of frequent litigation by un-
happy groups. In order to free public officials from
this fear of liability and in order to save govern-
ment time that would be spent defending the suits,
public officials are granted immunity.
2 7
Because governments only grant immunity to
enable public officials to make decisions that are
in the public interest, not everyone employed by
21 See, e.g., Hyde v. Lakewood, 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 156,
207 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1965).
26 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) grants immunity against
"[ainy claim ... based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function ... [by] an employee of the Government."
Among the state statutes granting immunity is CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1976), which states: "[A]
public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from
his act or omission where the act or omission was the
result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,
whether or not such discretion [was] abused."2 7 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). Justice
Harlan wrote in Barr:
The reasons for the recognition of the privilege
have been often stated. It has been thought impor-
tant that officials of government should be free to
exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of
damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of
those duties-suits which would consume time and
energies which would otherwise be devoted to gov-
ernmental service and the threat of which might
appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effec-
tive administration of policies of government.
Various states, while agreeing that officials exercising
discretion on basic policy decisions are entitled to im-
munity, have expressed the rationale behind the immu-
nity in different ways. For example, California justifies
immunity for state officials making basic policy decisions
on the grounds that if they were not immune, the courts
would be 'in the unseemly position of determining the
propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate
branch of government."' Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 445, 551 P.2d 334, 350, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 30 (1976) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d
782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248
(1968)). Pennsylvania has sovereign immunity so that
public officials will not be afraid to act where their action
cannot be measured by predictable standards of care.
DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 544, 393 A.2d
293, 295 (1978).
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the government is entitled to immunity. Only those
who exercise policymaking functions receive this
protection.2 Furthermore, not even all those exer-
cising discretion are exempted from full liability.
Absolute immunity is only given to those who
participate in the judicial process asjudges, 2 pros-
ecutors,3" grand jurors,3 ' and other similar posi-
tions.32 There is total immunity for them because
they are more likely to be sued than others and
because there are safeguards in the judicial process
itself to protect people from the errors of these
officials.33 Those government officials not perform-
ing some type ofjudicial function usually are given
only qualified immunity from suit. Under this type
of immunity, they are not liable for mere mistakes
in judgment, but they can be sued if they knew or
should have known that their actions violated
clearly established laws.?
Prior to Ferri and Reese, there was no consensus
on whether government-appointed attorneys for
indigents were granted any type of immunity from
tort malpractice suits. One case assumed that a
court-appointed attorney in a federal trial could be
sued for malpractice in state court, but that as-
sumption was not crucial to the resolution of the
case.'" Two other cases, in brief one-page opinions,
held that there was immunity for federally ap-
pointed defense attorneys.3 6 The only case that
directly considered whether state public defenders
were immune under state law held that there was
no immunity.37 In dicta, the Seventh Circuit rec-
2 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507; Johnson v.
State, 69 Cal. 2d at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr.
at 248.
' Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,347 (1871).
30 Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), aff'g 12 F.2d
396 (2d Cir. 1926).
"1 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,422-23 (1976)
("[t]he common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based
upon the same considerations that underlie the common-
law immunities ofjudges and grand jurors acting within
the scope of their duties").
2 Economou v. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (holding that
administrative officials who performed functions similar
to those performed by judges and prosecutors were ab-
solutely immune from suit).
3 Id. These safeguards include the adversary nature of
the process, the importance of precedent in resolving
controversies, and the correctability of error on appeal.
34 Id. at 506-07.
3 Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1979).
3 6 Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971);
Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966).
17 Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871
(1975). The court in Spring considered three arguments
supporting immunity for state public defenders and re-
jected all of them. First, it held that public defenders are
ognized the possibility that Illinois might grant
state court-appointed attorneys immunitys but a
later Seventh Circuit case held that Illinois would
recognize malpractice actions against state public
defenders.3 9 Another federal court also stated in
dicta that North Carolina might grant state public
defenders immunity.
40
Ferri and Reese brought direction to this confus-
ing, contradictory array of cases. In Ferri, the Su-
preme Court determined that federal law does not
grant government-appointed attorneys immunity
from state malpractice suits.4t Reese represented the
first extensive state court treatment of the immu-
nity problem, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court came to the same conclusion as the federal
court-no common-law right of immunity.42 To-
gether these cases substantially bolster the view
not judicial officers. Since they perform a private func-
tion, not a public one, they do not have the type of
immunity shared by judges and prosecutors and others
who represent the public in court. Second, the court held
that a public defender was not a public official like a
legislator because the defender did not perform any
government functions. Instead of protecting the public,
he had to protect his "client." Finally, there was no
statute granting the public defender immunity.
38 Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973). In
Walker, the client had appealed his Illinois conviction in
Illinois court, alleging among other things that his court-
appointed attorney's incompetence caused his conviction.
Walker v. Pate, 53 Ill. 2d 485, 292 N.E.2d 387 (1973).
The client also brought a malpractice suit in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d at
803. After the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction, the Seventh Circuit said that the Illinois courts
might find that there was no cause of action for malprac-
tice for any one of a number of reasons. One reason was
that Illinois might provide immunity to court-appointed
attorneys. The court said that "there are strong reasons
of policy which might persuade the Illinois courts to hold
that a lawyer, who has been appointed to serve without
compensation in the defense of an indigent citizen ac-
cused of crime, should be immune from malpractice
liability." Id. at 804. Requiring an attorney to defend
malpractice charges would only make it difficult for the
Bar to discharge its professional responsibilities. Id.
Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978).
In Robinson, the Seventh Circuit said that "the defendant
would arguably have the same state action in tort for
malpractice against the public defender as a former client
might have against a retained attorney." Id. at 411.
" Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C.
1968). In Vance, the District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina said that if the state public defender
"did the things alleged in the complaint he may be liable
to the plaintiff for civil damages in an action at law in
the courts of North Carolina." Id. at 788.
41 100 S. Ct. at 410.
42 406 A.2d at 740 (plurality opinion).
1980]
that government-appointed attorneys have neither
state nor federal immunity from state malpractice
suits.
4 3
FERRI AND THE IMMUNITY QUESTION UNDER
FEDERAL LAW
In Ferri, an indigent defendant after being con-
victed in federal court sued his court-appointed
attorney in Pennsylvania state court. He alleged
that his attorney had committed malpractice in
numerous instances, including the attorney's fail-
ure to raise a statute of limitation defense that
would have barred prosecution on several of the
counts for which the client received substantial
sentences.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court decisions that the court-
appointed attorney was immune from suit.45 Be-
cause the attorney had been appointed by a federal
court, the Pennsylvania court looked to federal
law46 and concluded that federal law granted the
attorney immunity from state malpractice suits.
47
The United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the Ferri decision. It held that federal law
did not grant an attorney appointed by a federal
court immunity from a state malpractice suit.
48
The Court began its reasoning by assuming that
the attorney would not be immune under state
law.4 9 Therefore, the only issue was whether federal
law would grant the attorney immunity and thus
supersede the state finding of liability.5°
The Court acknowledged that there were federal
interests in this case that could have required a
federal rule of immunity if such a finding were in
43 One indication that state courts are likely to follow
the holdings in Ferri and Reese is the fact that the Reese
case relied heavily on the discussion of immunity in
Spring, the only prior case dealing with the issue of public
defender immunity under the common law. Reese v.
Danforth, 406 A.2d at 739.
" Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. 90, 92, 394 A.2d 553, 554
(1978).
'5 Id. at 99, 394 A.2d at 558.
46 Id. at 93, 394 A.2d at 555.
41 Id. at 99, 394 A.2d at 558.
48 100 S. Ct. at 410.
"Id. at 406. On remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that state law did not grant immunity to the
court-appointed attorney. Ferri v. Ackerman, 411 A.2d
213, 214 (Pa. 1980).
5o A federal grant of immunity is binding on the state
courts under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI,
cl. 2, which states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding."
accord with the statutory or court-developed law
of immunity.5' The attorney had been appointed
and compensated pursuant to a federal statute,
and he had participated in a federal proceeding.
However, the Court found no statutory basis for
a grant of immunity to federally appointed attor-
neys. 52 The only arguably relevant statute, the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964,53 attempted to min-
imize the difference between privately retained and
court-appointed counsel by compensating ap-
pointed attorneys. The implication from the pur-
pose of the law was that appointed attorneys should
be subject to the same liability that retained law-
yers face.54
The Court went on to recognize that some fed-
eral officers have been granted immunity in the
absence of any statute.5 5 It reasoned that the duties
of federally appointed attorneys, however, were
significantly different from the duties of those of-
ficials who had been granted immunity at common
law, such as judges and prosecutors. Such officials
were required to represent the interests of society
as a whole. The immunity granted to them was
designed as a protection from disgruntled groups
whose desires were not always identical to those of
the public. In contrast, an appointed attorney's
only duty was to the defendant he was appointed
to represent. He had no conflicting responsibility
to the public and could avoid malpractice suits by
fulfilling his duty to the defendant.'
The Court did acknowledge that there might be
policy reasons to grant appointed counsel immu-
nity. For example, immunity might be needed to
recruit attorneys. Nevertheless, the Court held that
the legislature must be the one to determine
whether to grant immunity because of policy con-
cerns.
5 7 The Court, however, refused to indicate
whether Congress would have the power to grant
appointed attorneys immunity from state law tort
liability.-s
si 100 S. Ct. at 406.
52 id.
5 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2) (1976).
54 100 S. Ct. at 407.
Id. at 408.
6 Id. at 409.
57 Id. at 410.
s Id. Although the Court did not specify why Congress
might not be able to grant appointed attorneys immu-
nity, others have said that the Constitution would not
allow immunity for two reasons. First, grants of immunity
would violate the equal protection clause because indi-
gents who received inadequate legal assistance would be
denied the remedy of a malpractice suit available to those
able to retain private counsel. Second, unless clients could
sue their appointed attorneys, the appointed attorneys
COMMENTS [Vol. 71
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REESE AND THE IMMUNITY QUESTION UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA LAW
Even though it is not as far reaching as Ferr, the
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Reese is noteworthy since it is one of only two cases
that has considered whether state law grants state
public defenders immunity. Although the court in
Reese agreed with the earlier Connecticut Supreme
Court decision in Spring v. Constantino59 opposing
immunity, Reese contained a more thorough dis-
cussion of the policy reasons favoring immunity,
largely because it was decided by a divided court
and contained a number of opinions, each devel-
oping a different aspect of the immunity problem.
In Reese, an indigent sued a county public de-
fender and members of his staff who had repre-
sented the indigent in proceedings brought against
him pursuant to the Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966.r° Alleging that his seven-
day confinement in a psychiatric hospital was
caused by the attorneys' negligence, he sought
damages. The trial court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss, holding that a public defender
is immune from malpractice suits. The appellate
court affirmed without opinion.
6
1
A divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that state public defenders are liable for malprac-
62tice. Justice Nix, in his plurality opinion, began
would not provide their clients with effective counsel.
Thus the government would have breached its sixth
amendment duty to provide indigents with assistance of
counsel at criminal trials. See Comment, Liability of Court-
Appointed Defense Counsel for Malpractice in Federal Criminal
Prosecutions, 57 IowA L. REv. 1420, 1428-29 (1972).
59 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975), discussed in
note 37 supra.
60 406 A.2d at 736-37.
61 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 604, 360 A.2d 629 (1976), rev'd,
406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979) (plurality opinion).
6 Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d at 740. Justice Nix took
the approach that public defenders are not public officials
and that public policy dictates that they be made liable
for their negligence. Id. Justice Manderino, in a concur-
ring opinion, agreed with Justice Nix's opinion except
that Manderino wished to stress that a public defender
represents the sovereign in the same way that a district
attorney does and that neither party in a criminal pro-
ceeding should put the sovereign's interest in conviction
ahead of fairness to the defendant. Id. at 741 (Manderino,
J., concurring). In a second concurring opinion, Justice
Roberts, writing for himself and for Justice Larsen,
stressed that public defenders exercise no more discretion
than do private attorneys. He pointed out that granting
immunity to public defenders would only cause the poor
to receive legal services inferior to those received by
paying defendants. Id. at 741 (Roberts, J., concurring).
by announcing that the case was governed by
Pennsylvania state law on official immunity.63 The
cases on the federal common law of immunity'
and the cases that dealt with the state-action re-
quirement for purposes of section 1983 were not
controlling because Reese involved neither a federal
defender nor a federal claim.5
According to Justice Nix, the determination of
a state public defender's immunity under Pennsyl-
vania law depended on whether he was a public
official, in which case he would get some measure
of immunity, or whether he was only a public
employee and thus entitled to no immunity.' Jus-
tice Nix based his decision that the public defender
was an employee rather than an official on the fact
that a public defender does not exercise the sover-
eign function of policymaking. 67 In contrast to a
Justice O'Brien dissented, saying that public policy man-
dates that public defenders receive immunity. Id. at 746
(O'Brien, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Eagen joined in
Justice O'Brien's dissent with the exception of Justice
O'Brien's statement that Pennsylvania determines im-
munity solely on the basis of whether the grant of im-
munity in a particular case meets the reasons behind
immunity. Chief Justice Eagen believed that immunity
should be granted on a "classification" basis. Id. at 746
(Eagen, C.J., dissenting).
6 406 A.2d at 737.
' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had decided one
case on the issue of whether federal law grants federally
appointed attorneys immunity about eleven months be-
fore it decided Reese. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. 90,
394 A.2d 553 (1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979). It is
interesting to note that in Ferri the court held that a
federal court-appointed attorney was immune from a
state malpractice suit on the basis of the federal common
law of immunity, while in Reese the court held that a
state public defender was not immune from a state
malpractice suit. Justice Nix authored the opinion in
both cases. In Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. at 100-01, 394
A.2d at 558-59, Justices Roberts and Larsen dissented,
using the same reasons they later relied on for their
concurrence in Reese. See note 70 infra.
65 406 A.2d at 737.
I d. at 737. Justice Nix acknowledged that in the
previous year the court had changed the doctrine of
official immunity in its decision in DuBree v. Common-
wealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978). However, in a
footnote,Justice Nix simply stated that DuBree contracted
the scope of official immunity so it was necessary to
determine first whether state public defenders could even
meet the broader guidelines for immunity found in the
older cases. 406 A.2d at 737 n.7.
6 406 A.2d at 738. In determining that a public de-
fender was not a public official, Justice Nix relied upon
a previous Pennsylvania Supreme Court case in which
the court held that a county solicitor was not a public
official. Commonwealth ex rel. Foreman v. Hampson, 393
Pa. 467, 143 A.2d 369 (1958). However, in Foreman the
court was not determining whether the solicitor was a
district attorney who represents the interests of the
county, a public defender does not represent the
public but instead represents his appointed
,,client. ' ' 68
In his opinion, Justice Nix rejected the defenders'
arguments that immunity is needed to recruit good
lawyers and to encourage the public defenders to
use their discretion to perform their functions re-
sponsibly.69 He argued that the Pennsylvania court
does not determine whether a person has sovereign
immunity by examining the effect that tort liability
will have on the office. Instead, the court deter-
mines which people have immunity by looking at
the functions they perform. Only officials who
perform policymaking functions have immunity
and since public defenders have no policymaking
function, Justice Nix concluded that they are not
entitled to immunity. 70
public official for purposes of granting him immunity.
Instead, the issue in .that case was whether the solicitor as
a public official had to be appointed from among the
residents in the county. The court did not want to require
solicitors to be residents because the particular county
involved in the case had only 5,000 residents and three
practicing attorneys residing there, one of whom was
already the district attorney. If the county government
could choose from among only those three lawyers, it
would not have had much of a selection. Therefore, the
court held that the county solicitor was simply a profes-
sional employee, not a public official. Obviously, different
criteria would be relevant to the question of sovereign
immunity than were involved in a determination of
residency requirements.
6 406 A.2d at 738. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 372, 93 A.2d 834, 842
(1953), had held that district attorneys are public offi-
cials.
This was the only point of disagreement between
Justices Nix and Manderino. Justice Manderino agreed
with the holding in Reese that public defenders are not
public officials who are entitled to sovereign immunity.
However, he took pains to stress that neither the district
attorney nor the public defender should allow their ac-
tions to be controlled by outside forces and both had a
responsibility to see that no criminal defendant was
convicted unjustly. His concurrence probably was in-
tended to rebut any suggestion that district attorneys
were controlled by the state and wanted to try to convict
innocent people. 406 A.2d at 741 (Manderino, J., con-
curring).
6 406 A.2d at 740.
70 Id. In their concurrence, Justices Roberts and Larsen
specifically refuted the idea that public defenders need
to be immune so that they will perform theirjobs profes-
sionally. The justices argued that public defenders are
just like private attorneys and need no more freedom or
encouragement to exercise their professional judgment
than private attorneys. Since private attorneys can exer-
cise their judgment in spite of their liability for any
Justice Nix also reasoned that granting public
defenders immunity would cause equal protection
problems because a paying client could get relief
from his attorney's malpractice in situations where
an indigent could not. 71 Therefore, even if public
defenders did perform policymaking functions and
thus were entitled to immunity under state law,
Justice Nix thought the equal protection clause
prevented the states from granting them immu-
nity.72
The two dissenting justices did not discuss
whether public defenders were considered public
officials or public employees. 73 One of the dissenters
noted that during the previous term the court had
held that sovereign immunity did not depend solely
upon whether someone was classified as a public
official, but instead was determined on the basis of
a case-by-case analysis of whether the grant of
immunity would further the policies behind pro-
tection of officials from liability.74 Under the cur-
rent law, said the dissenters, a public servant is
entitled to immunity only when his duties are such
that they require an exercise of discretion that
would be hampered if he were subject to liability.
Therefore, it does not matter how a public defender
is classified; what is important is whether granting
the public defender immunity would advance the
policies that immunity is supposed to further.
75
Both dissenters agreed that public policy did
require immunity,76 relying on the same policy
reasons expressed in the federal cases that had held
that public defenders are immune from section
1983 actions.7 7 These reasons are the need to recruit
and to retain lawyers as public defenders and the
necessity
"to encourage counsel in the full exercise of profes-
sionalism, i.e., the unfettered discretion, in the light
negligence, public defenders also should be able to per-
form responsibly without immunity. Id. at 741 (Roberts,
J., concurring).
71 406 A.2d at 740.
72Id.
73 Id. at 741 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
74 DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d
293 (1978).
75 406 A.2d at 741 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 746.
77Justice O'Brien cited Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899,
900-01 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977),
John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973), and
Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973), as cases using these policy
reasons to support their decisions to give public defenders
some type of immunity from § 1983 suits. 406 A.2d at
745 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
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of their training and experience, to decline to press
the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent
litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard
to a single litigant as to how best his interests may
be advanced." 78
The dissent also took the position that immunity
did not present any equal protection problems.
7 9
They pointed out that the Supreme Court had
held that not all people must have exactly equal
advantages.8° As long as the grant of immunity
furthers a legitimate state interest, which it does by
advancing the previously discussed policies,8 ' it
does not violate the equal protection clause.
82
Nor did the dissent agree that the grant of
immunity would violate the state's obligation to
provide counsel for indigents. They took the posi-
tion that the state had fulfilled that duty simply
by establishing public defenders' offices and that
disciplinary proceedings could be used to ensure
that the counsel was effective.
8
3
ANALYSIS OF IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW
Despite the vigorous dissent in Reese, both Ferri
and Reese correctly applied the traditional views
concerning official immunity in reaching their con-
clusions that the government-appointed attorneys
in those cases were not entitled to immunity. As
discussed above,8 ' immunity traditionally has been
granted to protect the proper functioning of gov-
ernment. Officials in policymaking positions have
been granted immunity because they must consider
the welfare of all citizens, not just the interests of
the most litigious group. Neither federally ap-
pointed attorneys nor state public defenders, how-
ever, have policymaking roles. Their job is not to
determine what is in the best interest of the public
as a whole. Instead, they must be advocates only
for their assigned defendants. Unlike other public
servants, they do not have to juggle interests; they
only have to pursue the interests of their clients,
78 Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 901, quoted in Reese v.
Danforth, 406 A.2d at 744 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
9 406 A.2d at 742 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 742 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973)).
81 406 A.2d at 742 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). According
to the dissent, another compelling reason to treat public
defenders differently than private counsel is that unlike
private counsel, they are not free to refuse to contract
with their clients. Id. See the discussion of this problem
at note 100 infra.
82 406 A.2d at 746 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 746.
83 Id. at-, 406 A.2d at 746.
84 See notes 27-34 & accompanying text supra.
and therefore, pursuant to prior cases, they are not
entitled to immunity.
However, although Ferri and Reese are consistent
with the other cases on immunity for public offi-
cials, they are inconsistent with some, though not
all, of the cases dealing with government-appointed
attorneys' liability for constitutional violations.
There is no conflict between the finding in Ferri
and Reese that government-appointed attorneys are
not public officials and the holdings in some casess'
that the government action required to show a
constitutional or section 1983 cause of action is
lacking. Furthermore, even the holding that gov-
ernment attorneys do act under color of law could
be reconciled with the finding that the government
attorneys are not government officials entitled to
immunity since not all people acting under color
of law are entitled to immunity.86
An inconsistency arises, however, with the find-
ing by at least two courts87 that the government
attorneys acted under color of law, but that as
government officials they are immune from suit.
To reconcile Ferri and Reese with these cases would
require a decision that there are different standards
for immunity from section 1983 and constitutional
suits than there are for immunity from common
law tort suits. Since there do not appear to be any
cases that have drawn this distinction, it is at least
arguable that Ferri overruled the two cases that
found immunity from actions based on section
1983 or the Constitution.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY GRANTS OF
IMMUNITY
The Ferri case itself recognized that there may
be valid policy reasons why legislatures should
break with precedent and grant immunity to ap-
pointed counsel. 88 There are, in addition, several
reasons that were not mentioned in Ferri why leg-
islatures should immunize public defenders.8
82 See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
6 See note 28 & accompanying text supra.
7 Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401; Minns v.
Paul, 542 F.2d 899.
88 100 S. Ct. at 410. The Court in Ferri said that the
respondent had failed to present any empirical data to
support the policy reasons he advanced in favor of im-
munity, id. at 407 n.17, and took the position that the
legislature was better able to evaluate any empirical
evidence that would be available. Id. at 410.
s9 As discussed in the text accompanying notes 28-34
supra, there are two types of immunity, absolute and
qualified. Because absolute immunity would eliminate
all suits against government-appointed attorneys, it
would achieve the policy reasons favoring immunity more
The reason found most persuasive by the Court
in Ferri was the need to recruit appointed counsel.90
As the Court noted, appointed counsel receive
significantly lower income than retained counsel,
and the burden of defending unfounded malprac-
tice claims for appointed counsel is substantial. 9
However, the government could solve this barrier
to recruitment without a grant of immunity simply
by promising to defend any malpractice suits
against appointed counsel and to pay any judg-
ments that result from the suits.
The second problem of unfounded malpractice
claims, however, is impossible to solve without
immunity because the sheer number of tort suits
likely to be filed will deter attorneys from accepting
positions as appointed counsel. Legal malpractice
suits in general are increasing in number.92 Addi-
tionally, it has been observed that indigents are
more likely to bring frivolous suits than those re-
taining counsel. 93 One reason for this is that indi-
gents have no economic brake on their desire to
sue.9 They can avoid all costs of suit by bringing
their actions pro se and in forma pauperis and
thereby avoid paying either attorney's fees or court
costs. Another factor contributing to the increase
in malpractice suits by indigents is that public
defenders do not have the time to give their clients
extensive individualized attention. One of the ma-
jor causes of medical and legal malpractice suits is
the client's feeling that the professional lacks a
personal relationship with his client.95 Public de-
fenders, with their large caseloads, do not have
time to develop these personal relationships with
the defendants they are appointed to represent.so
Therefore, they are likely to get a greater number
of malpractice suits filed against them. Thus, to
recruit competent attorneys, the appointed attor-
neys must be immune from the large number of
tort suits they potentially could face.
Not only will immunity help in recruiting com-
closely than would qualified immunity. Even qualified
immunity, though, would accomplish these policies, at
least in part, by quickly eliminating the many cases in
which the public defender did not knowingly violate his
client's rights, but instead merely made a mistake in
judgment.
90 100 S. Ct. at 409.
91 Id.
9 Mallen, The Court Appointed Lawyer and Legal Mal-
practice-Liability or Immunity, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 59, 68
(1976).
93 Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 901-02.
94 Id.
9s Mallen, supra note 92, at 60.
9 See Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at 410.
petent attorneys, it will enable the appointed at-
torneys to do a better job. By freeing the appointed
attorneys from having to defend malpractice suits,
immunity will allow the attorneys to spend all of
their time defending indigents. Other classes of
officials have been granted immunity because it
was recognized that they could do a better job if
they devoted their time to government service,
rather than to the defense of malpractice suits.
9 7
Since public defenders are already overworked,99
they certainly could do a better job if they did not
have their own malpractice suits added to their
already heavy caseloads.
In addition to giving the public defenders more
time to devote to the defendants they are appointed
to represent, immunity will enable them to use
their best judgment on cases. 99 Private attorneys.
are able to remain in control of cases because they
can terminate the relationship with the client if the
client and the attorney disagree over the appropri-
ate litigation strategy. Public defenders, on the
other hand, are required to represent all of the
defendants to whom they are assigned. Even if the
defendants will not listen to the attorneys, the
public defenders must continue to represent
them.1so Many indigent defendants, particularly
repeat offenders, think they are as competent as
attorneys.1° ' Therefore, they are likely to tell their
attorneys how to conduct the cases. If the public
defenders are afraid of malpractice suits, they may
follow the defendants' advice in order to placate
them. At best this means the public defender may
be filing many worthless motions and pursuing
frivolous defenses; at worst it means the attorney is
conducting the cases in a manner detrimental to
his clients.'
0 2
Without immunity, attorneys will be hampered
97 See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571, in which
the Court granted some federal officials immunity so that
the defense of malpractice suits would not "consume time
and energies which would otherwise be devoted to gov-
ernmental service."
9 Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at 410.
9 Canon 6 of the ABA Code of Professional Respon-
sibility creates a duty for a lawyer to use his best judgment
by stating: "A Lawyer should represent a client compe-
tently." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Canon 6.
lo The court acknowledged in Robinson v. Bergstrom:
"The public defender has virtually no control over which
clients he will accept or reject." 579 F.2d at 410. An
attorney may not refuse appointment in federal court
without good cause. Comment, supra note 58, at 1427.
101 See Nakles, Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Case for
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when they try to decide how to appeal convictions.
Public defenders sometimes appeal on the basis
that the defendant had ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial. 03 If public defenders know they
will be liable for malpractice, they are less likely to
make this argument. It is true that at least one
court has held that if an attorney argues ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal, that argument will
not be taken as an admission, and the appeal
cannot be used as evidence against the attorney in
a malpractice suitY' 4 Most government-appointed
attorneys, however, would probably not want to
give their clients the idea for a malpractice suit.
05
Thus, immunity would provide indigents with
more effective counsel in three ways. First it would
help recruit competent attorneys. Second, it would
give the attorney more time to devote to his client.
Third, it would allow the attorney to exercise his
professional judgment on defense strategies, partic-
ularly on appeal arguments.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY IMMUNITY
Although the Court in Ferri refused to decide
whether the legislature has the power to grant
government-appointed attorneys immunity,' 6 it
does not appear that the United States Constitu-
tion bars legislatures from breaking with precedent
and immunizing government-appointed attorneys
from tort actions in order to gain the policy advan-
tages mentioned above. Many legislatures have
already granted immunity to individuals in certain
circumstances and thereby abolished the common-
law tort actions formerly available against them.0
When these statutes have been challenged, the
Court consistently has upheld their constitutional-
ity.10
103 See Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1968); Johnson v. United States, 328 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1964); People v. Lang, I1 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113
Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
104 Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118
Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), overruled on other grounds sub nom. In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
105 Mallen, supra note 92, at 67-68.
'06 100 S. Ct. at 410.
S See, e.g., ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 111, § 4404 (1973) (a
"good samaritan" statute granting medical personnel
immunity from tort actions based on any voluntary,
emergency medical assistance they provide); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 9.2101 (1949) (granting drivers immunity from
tort actions brought by guests riding in their cars).
'08 Martinez v. California, 100 S. Ct. 553, 558 (1980)
(holding that a California statute granting absolute im-
munity to public employees who make parole release
determinations did not violate the fourteenth amend-
If the legislatures were to abolish the common-
law tort actions against government-appointed at-
torneys, such laws immunizing attorneys who rep-
resent indigents would not create equal protection
problems.""9 The Court has not mandated that
indigents receive exactly the same treatment in the
criminal appellate process that nonindigents can
obtain." 0 Equal protection only requires that stat-
utes discriminating against indigents be 'free of
unreasoned distinctions."""' Because immunity
statutes for appointed attorneys are necessary to
recruit competent counsel for indigents and to
ensure that the counsel can perform their functions
most effectively, the immunity statutes do not set
up unreasoned distinctions.
The real constitutional question presented by
the possibility of a legislative grant of immunity to
public defenders is whether the immunity would
breach the government's duty under Gideon v. Wain-
wright"12 and Douglas v. California"3 to provide effec-
tive legal counsel to indigents. Some of the com-
mentators and cases have argued that without this
right to sue, indigents would get inadequate legal
ment); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978) (upholding the Price-
Anderson Act which put a $560 million limitation on
liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation
of federally licensed private nuclear power plants); Silver
v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (upholding automobile
guest statutes which state that negligent drivers are im-
mune from suit by guests riding in their cars); Providence
& N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883)
(limitation of vessel owner's liability is constitutional).
109 It is interesting that the majority in Reese denied
immunity in part because they thought a grant of im-
munity would create equal protection problems. Yet a
year earlier, the same court in the Ferri case did not even
mention the equil protection clause when it held that
federal law granted federal court-appointed attorneys
immunity from state malpractice suits. 483 Pa. 90, 394
A.2d 553. Two justices dissented from the decision in
Ferri, however, because they perceived equal protection
problems. Id. at 100, 394 A.2d at 559 (Roberts, J., joined
by Larsen, J., dissenting). These same justices concurred
in Reese on the ground that immunity grants were im-
proper as a violation of equal protection. 406 A.2d at 741
(Roberts, J., joined by Larsen, J., concurring).
"0For example, in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974), the Court held that states did not have to provide
indigent defendants with counsel when taking discretion-
ary appeals to the highest state court or when petitioning
for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
111 Id. at 612 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305,
310 (1966)).
"2 373 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent has a constitutional
right to an attorney during his criminal trial).
"n 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent has a constitutional
right to an attorney during his first appeal).
19801
advice and thus would be denied their sixth
amendment right to counsel." 4
There is no evidence, though, that a client's right
to a malpractice action guarantees him better ser-
vice from a professional. The number of medical
malpractice actions have increased substantially
recently, yet there is no evidence that medical care
has been improved because of these suits." 5 Legal
malpractice actions are also unlikely to produce
better legal care.
In fact, immunity laws actually would improve
the effectiveness of counsel for indigents. 1 6 By
aiding in recruitment, the statutes would upgrade
the quantity and quality of court-appointed coun-
sel. In addition, counsel would have time to devote
to their clients and would be able to make the best
decisions for their clients.
Moreover, there are other ways to ensure that
indigents receive effective counsel apart from mal-
practice actions. Defendants who are the victims of
poor legal advice can file habeas corpus actions or
appeal on the grounds of inadequate assistance of
counsel. 117 In addition, the incompetent public
"4 See, e.g., Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d at 741 (Rob-
erts, J., concurring); Comment, supra note 58, at 1429.
"5 See O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Lia-
bility: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries,
60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 517-19 (1976). O'Connell notes:
"Even Guido Calabresi, perhaps the leading advocate of
imaginative use of the tort and insurance system to
achieve deterrence, recently concluded that there is no
basis for believing that the present tort liability system
promotes quality medical care." Id. at 519.
11 See text accompanying notes 90-105 supra.
17 See Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at 410; Minns
v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 902; Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d at
1049.
defender can be disciplined in several ways. The
government can fire him and thus guarantee that
he does not injure other indigent defendants. In
addition, the supreme courts of the various states
can disbar the defender or otherwise impose sanc-
tions on him if he does not represent his client
competently. 1 8
CONCLUSION
While not liable for malpractice based on con-
stitutional or section 1983 claims, government-ap-
pointed attorneys after Ferri and Reese could be
liable under state tort actions for malpractice. The
Court in Ferri has said that federal law does not
give federally appointed attorneys immunity from
state malpractice suits. With Reese, there have now
been two major decisions holding that state public
defenders, and, by implication, federally appointed
attorneys, are not granted immunity by the states
from state malpractice actions.
Although these decisions correctly follow the
precedents on immunity, the outcome can and
should be changed by appropriate legislative ac-
tion. Granting government-appointed attorneys
immunity would help recruit competent counsel
and would give them more time to devote to their
cases. Counsel also would be able to exercise profes-
sional judgment on all matters of the defense,
including whether to appeal on the basis of inad-
equate counsel at trial. Moreover, all this can be
done without creating equal protection problems
or leading to ineffective assistance of counsel.
PATRICIA B. CARLSON
"'ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Canon 7.
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